

## VII.—Aurelian's Victory over Zenobia at Immae, A.D. 272

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Our only detailed source for the first campaign of Aurelian against Zenobia (A.D. 272) is Zosimus. Brief references to the emperor's victory over the Palmyrene queen are found in other writers, viz. *SHA Aurelian*, Rufius Festus, Jordanes, Syncellus, Eutropius, the *Chronicle* of Eusebius-Hieronymus, and Malalas.<sup>1</sup> The accounts given by these sources have been thought to disagree with one another, and various efforts have been made to solve the supposed difficulties. A new examination of Zosimus' account, and a study of the geography of the operations will, however, suggest that Zosimus' story has not been completely understood; and it now seems possible to determine more precisely what occurred in the first clash near Antioch between the imperial forces and the Palmyrene troops.

Zosimus (1.50) relates that after Aurelian, on his march from Byzantium through Asia Minor, had taken Ancyra and Tyana from Zenobia's adherents, he found the queen in Antioch, "with a large force," prepared to fight. When he saw the famous Palmyrene cavalry in their heavy armor, the emperor realized that these horsemen were superior to his own. He then ordered his infantry to cross the Orontes river, and commanded his cavalry not to attack the Palmyrene horse, but to give way before them, in semblance of flight, until they saw that the Palmyrene horses and their riders were exhausted by the heat and the weight of their armor. This the Romans did, and when, as Aurelian anticipated, the Palmyrenes became worn out, the Roman cavalry attacked. Some of the Palmyrenes, Zosimus writes, were cut down, while others were killed by the horses, their own and the Romans'. Those who were able to escape reached Antioch (Zos. 1.51). Zenobia and her general Zabdas left Antioch for Emesa that night, evidently by the road which led through Daphne to Seleucobelus and then to Apamea,

<sup>1</sup> On the sources for this campaign, see L. Homo, *Essai sur le règne de l'empereur Aurélien* (Paris 1904; Bibl. des Écoles franç. d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 89) 9, 15–20.

whence they could have gone via Epiphania to Emesa. Aurelian entered Antioch the next day. A rearguard of Palmyrenes (Zosimus goes on, 1.52) established itself on a height above Daphne, probably in the region where the road, as one travels south after leaving Daphne itself, runs between precipitous spurs of the Kosseir range.<sup>2</sup> This force was dislodged and put to flight or slain. Aurelian then continued his march via Apamea, Larissa and Arethousa, all of which welcomed him, and the Romans finally encountered the main Palmyrene army in the plain before Emesa, where Zenobia was again defeated (Zos. 1.52–53). The queen fell back on Palmyra, where she prepared to stand a siege. When famine broke out in the city, she fled, but was captured by the Romans while she was crossing the Euphrates (Zos. 1.55–56).

No such detailed record appears in any of the other sources. The biography of Aurelian in the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae* (25) says that "Aurelian, by means of a brief engagement near Daphne, gained possession of Antioch," and that "after this, the whole issue of the war was decided near Emesa in a mighty battle fought against Zenobia and Zaba [i.e. Zabdas], her ally."<sup>3</sup> Zaba and Zenobia were put to flight, and eventually Zenobia was captured after the siege of Palmyra (26–29).

Even less information is given by the chroniclers. John Malalas, the sixth-century chronicler who lived at Antioch, writes (p. 300.8–11 Bonn ed.) that when Aurelian marched against Zenobia, the queen was encamped near the Orontes river, and that as soon as the emperor reached Antioch he defeated and captured the queen (this last detail is of course an error of anticipation, found in some of the sources listed below). Rufius Festus (*Brev.* 24) writes: [Zenobiam] Aurelianus multis clibanariorum et sagittariorum milibus fretam apud Immas haud procul ab Antiochia vicit et captam Romae triumphans ante currum duxit. Eutropius (9.13.2) records that Zenobiam . . . haud longe ab Antiochia sine gravi proelio cepit [sc. Aurelianus], ingressusque Romam nobilem triumphum

<sup>2</sup> See the contour map of Daphne and vicinity in P. Bazantay, "Contribution à l'étude géographique de la Syrie: Un petit pays alaouite, le plateau de Daphné," in the *Bulletin de l'enseignement* of the Haut-commissariat de la République française en Syrie et au Liban, 11, no. 6 (April 1934) 336. A photograph of part of these heights (looking south) is published in *Antioch-on-the-Orontes 1: The Excavations of 1932*, ed. by G. W. Elderkin (Princeton 1934) 107, fig. 1 (this may be the actual spot which the Palmyrenes occupied).

<sup>3</sup> I quote the translation of David Magie in the Loeb Classical Library.


. . . egit praecedentibus currum Tetrice et Zenobia. Syncellus (vol. 1, p. 721.10–12 Bonn ed.) writes that Aurelian defeated and captured Zenobia *πλησίον Ἀντιοχείας τῆς κατὰ Συρίαν ἐν Ἰμμαῖς καλουμένης χωρίῳ*. Jordanes (*Rom.* 291) writes: Aurelianus apud Hymmas [Hymas, Himmas, in inferior mss] vicino Antiochiae superavit [sc. Zenobiam] Romaeque in triumpho suo vivam perduxit. The entry in Eusebius-Hieronymus (an. Abr. 2289, Olymp. 263) is: Zenobia apud Immas haud longe ab Antiochia vincitur. No statement is made here as to Zenobia's capture, at Antioch or elsewhere, and nothing is said about a battle at Emesa, though under the next Olympiad there is a notation that Aurelian led Tetricus and Zenobia in his triumph in Rome.

Scholars have agreed that the narrative of Zosimus (who used excellent sources, notably Dexippus and Eunapius) is our best account of the campaign. Thus, since there is apparently no reference in Zosimus (or in Aurelian's biography in the *SHA*) to an engagement at Immae (mod. 'Imm, Yeni Şehir, on the Antioch-Beroea road, about 42 km. east of Antioch), it would look as though the chroniclers were mistaken in recording such an engagement.<sup>4</sup> In any case it seems clear, in the light of the narrative of Zosimus and of the biographer in the *SHA*, that the chroniclers are wrong in stating that Zenobia was captured after the battle at Immae (or, as Malalas says, after the battle at Antioch).

Various ways of solving the supposed difficulty have been proposed. J. Oberdick sought to reconcile the accounts by emending Zosimus' narrative of the battle at Daphne so as to transform this engagement into a battle at Immae. This Oberdick would achieve by substituting, for the words *Δάφνης τοῦ προαστείου* which occur in all mss of Zosimus, *Ἰμμης τοῦ* (scil. *τῆς Ἀντιοχείας προαστείου*).<sup>5</sup> No scholar, apparently, has accepted Oberdick's emendation. It was rejected by L. Mendelssohn in his edition of Zosimus (Leipzig, 1887) because it does not take into account the statement in the *SHA* that a fight took place at Daphne. E. Honigmann further

<sup>4</sup> In the Peutinger map the distance between Antioch and Immae is given as 33 Roman miles = 49.5 km. In this map the name is written Emma; in the *Ravenna Geography* it appears as Empsa. See E. Honigmann, "Syria," *RE* 4A (1932) 1657–1658, 1691–1692, and R. Dussaud, *Topographie historique de la Syrie antique et médiévale* (Paris 1927) 232.

<sup>5</sup> J. Oberdick, *Die römerfeindliche Bewegungen im Orient während der letzten Hälfte des 3. Jahrhunderts n. Chr.* (Berlin 1869), p. 99, n. 158, and p. 168. On Oberdick's account of the operations around Antioch, see further below, n. 17.



Sketch Map of Vicinity of Antioch (after Dussaud, *Topog. hist. de la Syrie ant. et méd.*, Pl. 14, and Mousterde and Poidebard, *Le Limes de Chalcis*, general map).

points out<sup>6</sup> that in emending the text to make Zosimus call Immae a suburb of Antioch, Oberdick forgot that Immae is 42 km. from Antioch, which hardly fits the description of a suburb. The principal basis and justification for Oberdick's emendation was his belief that Daphne is not on the road to Emesa, so that the action with the Palmyrene rear-guard which Zosimus describes could not have taken place at Daphne. On this point Oberdick either must have had no good map of Syria available, or must have failed to consult a map, for the road through Daphne is the most direct route from Antioch to Emesa. In thinking that Zosimus' description of the height upon which the Palmyrenes established themselves does not suit the topography of Daphne, Oberdick is likewise quite mistaken (he evidently had never visited the site, and had no detailed map of it). The heights mentioned above, on the road as one travels south just after leaving Daphne, command the road and would be admirably suited for a delaying action.

Mommsen<sup>7</sup> thought that the placing of the decisive battle at Immae was simply an error on the part of some of the chroniclers; the accounts of Zosimus and of Aurelian's biographer in the *SHA*, he believed, agree in all essentials. Mommsen's opinion was taken up and further developed by L. Homo,<sup>8</sup> who suggested that the chroniclers confused the names of Immae and Emesa; the decisive battle, which according to Zosimus and Aurelian's biographer in the *SHA* was fought at Emesa, was thus put by mistake at Immae. In support of his hypothesis, Homo pointed out that the name of Immae is also found written Emma (in the Peutinger map), Imissa and Immos. Homo followed Zosimus in supposing that there were three battles, one on the bank of the Orontes, the second at Daphne, the third at Emesa.<sup>9</sup> A cogent objection to Homo's argument that the names of Immae and Emesa were confused is pointed out by Honigsmann,<sup>10</sup> who observes that it would be very difficult indeed to confuse a world-famous city such as Emesa with an obscure village such as Immae; and the present writer has found no evidence

<sup>6</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, n. 4) 1691–1692.

<sup>7</sup> *Röm. Gesch.* 5<sup>4</sup> (Berlin 1894) p. 440, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Op. cit.* (above n. 1) p. 93, n. 1.

<sup>9</sup> Homo's exposition is followed by H. M. D. Parker, *A History of the Roman World from A.D. 138 to 337* (London 1935) 199–201, with notes on 349–350. H. Mattingly, in *CAH* 12 (1939) 303–304, adopts the same view; he rearranges the sequence of the events in the first battle described by Zosimus (see below, n. 17).

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, n. 4) 1691–1692.

that Immae was called Imissa or Immos (Homo does not mention his source for this information).

Still another explanation is offered by Honigmann.<sup>11</sup> While recognizing the possibility that, as Nöldeke and Groag believe, Zosimus' first battle was fought at Immae (see further below), Honigmann is more inclined to believe that the appearance in the chroniclers of Immae as the location of Aurelian's decisive victory is the result of a confusion with Elagabalus' victory over Macrinus at Immae in A.D. 218. This confusion of the two battles would (according to Honigmann) be aided, but not caused, by the similarity of the names of Emesa and Immae.

Such, then, are the opinions of the scholars who regard the notice of Aurelian's victory at Immae as an error. There are, however, students who believe that such an engagement occurred, or may have occurred.<sup>12</sup>

R. Dussaud<sup>13</sup> points out that one of the roads by which Aurelian could have marched on Antioch is that which passes to the east of the Lake of Antioch, from which one may reach the Antioch-Beroea road and proceed west to Antioch, crossing the Orontes at Gephyra (mod. Džisr el-Hadid).<sup>14</sup> By this route, the Romans would have passed not far from Immae; and Dussaud suggests that it was the Palmyrene detachment which was stationed to guard this road which the Romans encountered (see map on p. 60).

A generally correct understanding of the events was also reached by E. Groag,<sup>15</sup> who suggested that Aurelian, in order to cut the

<sup>11</sup> *Op. cit.* (above, n. 4) 1691-1692.

<sup>12</sup> Th. Nöldeke, in his long review article, "Ueber Mommsens Darstellung der römischen Herrschaft u. römischen Politik im Orient," *ZDMG* 39 (1885) 339, remarks that he does not agree with Mommsen's opinion (cited above, n. 7) that Immae and Emesa were confused; "irgend einen Kampf" (Nöldeke writes) "wird es auch da in diesem Kriege gegeben haben." The reference to p. 336 of Nöldeke's study which Mendelssohn gives in the critical apparatus of his edition of Zosimus, p. 36, is a typographical error.

<sup>13</sup> *Loc. cit.* (above, n. 4).

<sup>14</sup> See Dussaud, *op. cit.* (above, n. 4), map no. 14, facing p. 476. There is some reason to doubt that the crossing of the Orontes at this point was called Gephyra; see Honigmann, *op. cit.* (above, n. 4) 1656. However, the point is not essential here. On the details of the road to the east of the Lake of Antioch (the location of which was not precisely known when Dussaud wrote), see the information of Poidebard and Mouterde, cited below, n. 16. The terrain about the Lake of Antioch must have been much less swampy in ancient times than it is today; see the description of the region (with observations on its military importance) by Lt. Col. P. Jacquot, *Antioche, centre de tourisme* (Antioch, Comité de tourisme; Beyrouth, Imprimerie catholique 1931) 1.166-168.

<sup>15</sup> "L. Domitius Aurelianus," *RE* 5 (1905) 1383-1384.

Palmyrenes' line of retreat southward along the Orontes, made a flanking movement with his cavalry toward the east; with this theory, Groag thinks, agree the circumstances, noted by Zosimus, (1) that the Roman infantry and cavalry were separated by the emperor, (2) that Aurelian faced only Palmyrene cavalry, and (3) that the Romans are said to have won without the intervention of the infantry. All this, Groag evidently thinks, could have taken place at Immae; and so the first battle which Zosimus mentions, whose location he does not specify, could have been the battle of Immae which the chroniclers mention.

Dussaud and Groag are certainly right in the essential points of their hypotheses; though they did not have occasion to reconstruct the course of the battle in detail. A number of points remain to be worked out, and it is hoped that it will now be possible both to reconstruct the sequence of events in greater detail than has hitherto been done, and to explain some of the apparent difficulties in the evidence as it has come down to us.

To begin with, there are two points in Zosimus' narrative which in the present writer's opinion have not been properly appreciated. First, Zosimus' statement (1.50, p. 35.16-17 ed. Mendelssohn) that Aurelian before the engagement sent his infantry across the Orontes (evidently in order to keep them out of the way of the Palmyrene horse) has by some scholars been taken to mean that the engagement itself took place on the banks of the river. This need not, however, necessarily follow. The second point to be borne in mind is that Zosimus does not say where the engagement itself took place, or name the scene of action. This would seem to mean either that he did not know, or that (in his opinion or his source's) a name could not be given to the locality.

If, with these observations in mind, we examine the terrain about Antioch, it will be found that it is easy to reach a plausible reconstruction of the operation, some features of which have already been suggested by Groag and Dussaud.

It can safely be assumed that Antioch would be Aurelian's first objective in northern Syria. In his final approach to the city, he would have a choice of two routes. One would be the Pagrae-Antioch road which led straight to Antioch along the western side of the Lake of Antioch. The other would be the road which skirted the eastern side of the lake. By this one would come first to the road leading to Gindarus. After proceeding along the

Gindarus road, one would reach the Antioch-Beroea road, east of the crossing of the Orontes at Gephyra.<sup>16</sup> Immae lay on the Antioch-Beroea road, about 18 km. or 12 miles east of the crossing of the Orontes at Gephyra, and about 9 km. or 6 miles east of the point where the road to Gindarus left the Antioch-Beroea road. If Aurelian chose to approach Antioch from the east, either in order to confuse the Palmyrene staff or in order to be in a position to encircle the city and cut the escape route south (or both), he would thus reach the Antioch-Beroea road half-way between Gephyra and Immae.

The evidence indicates that the Palmyrene force which the Romans encountered was of substantial size. Zosimus says that Zenobia had a large force at Antioch (στρατῶ πολλῶ, 1.50, p. 35.12 ed. Mendelssohn), and since the results of the battle at Immae were serious enough to cause Zenobia and Zabdas to abandon Antioch—Zosimus' statement that they left the city ἄμα τῶ λελειμμένῳ στρατεύματι (1.51, p. 36.10) implies that no great force was left to them after the battle—it would seem that a major Palmyrene force was involved in this first clash with the Romans. If the Palmyrene commander had word of the Romans' approach along the east of the lake, he might very well have decided to dispatch most of his cavalry along the Antioch-Beroea road to meet them, for two reasons. First, the Romans, if intercepted in time, could approach the city from only one direction, and second (and more important) the country along the Antioch-Beroea road between Gephyra and Immae offered better opportunity for cavalry manoeuvre than any place closer to Antioch except the plain across the river from the city along the Pagrae-Antioch road, along which the Romans would not be coming.

This of course does not exclude the possibility that (as has been suggested) there was also present, when the Romans arrived, a Palmyrene cavalry unit stationed at Immae to guard the Antioch-Beroea road and to be at hand if the Romans approached along the

<sup>16</sup> The main features of the road system are shown by Dussaud, *loc. cit.* (above, n. 14). Since Dussaud wrote, however, a closer study of the road to Gindarus, made by R. Mouterde and A. Poidebard, shows that this road did not leave the Antioch-Beroea highway at Gephyra, as Dussaud believed, but branched off east of Gephyra, approximately midway between Gephyra and Immae; see Mouterde and Poidebard, *Le Limes de Chalcis* (Paris 1945), general map in pocket at end of volume of plates. The sketch map printed in the present study, for which I am indebted to R. L. Van Nice, is based upon the maps of Dussaud and of Mouterde and Poidebard.



east of the lake. In any case it seems plain that the Palmyrene force was of sufficient size to engage the whole of Aurelian's cavalry and that (as has been remarked) its defeat was enough of a disaster to cause the evacuation of Antioch. The scholars who have had the impression that Immae was a minor encounter have apparently not had in mind the considerations pointed out above; and they may have been influenced, as well, by the words of Eutropius, who writes that Aurelian captured Zenobia "*haud longe ab Antiochia sine gravi proelio.*" Eutropius' words, however, are not enough to outweigh the other evidence pointed out above, and it may be that the phrase which he used ought (whether he knew it nor not) to have referred to the later engagement at Daphne.

Just where the Palmyrenes and the Romans would have met each other, there is now no way of determining. Zosimus' account suggests that when Aurelian learned that he was facing Palmyrene cavalry in force, he detached his infantry and sent it across the Orontes because he knew it could not stand against the Palmyrene horse. Just how this would be done, we cannot, for lack of evidence, determine; but it would not be difficult to ford the Orontes in this region in the summer. Presumably, however, the Roman and the Palmyrene cavalry would at this initial stage have been on the same side of the Orontes (again presumably, on the east of the river), and it would have been possible for the Roman infantry to circle and cross the river on the flank of the Palmyrenes (see further below, n. 17).

The main point is that when the Roman and the Palmyrene cavalry met, the Romans began a movement of simulated flight, so that the enemy might be worn out by the weight of their armor and by the heat. If we suppose that in doing this the Romans withdrew toward the east (which is, in the nature of the terrain, the only direction in which they could have moved), then the possible explanation of the discrepancy concerning Immae in the sources becomes apparent. The Roman withdrawal must have covered a sufficient distance, and a sufficient length of time, to exhaust the Palmyrenes fairly completely. Something more than a mile or two must have been involved. If, then, we can suppose that the Romans and the Palmyrenes originally met at some point between Gephyra and the point where the Gindarus road left the Antioch-Beroea road; and if we can further suppose that the Romans then began to withdraw toward the east, along the Antioch-

Beroea road, it seems quite possible that the withdrawal reached Immae before the Romans turned on the enemy. Here, then, would seem to lie the explanation of why the battle is placed at Immae by some sources but not by others. If the engagement followed the course suggested here, it would be possible from one point of view to say that it occurred at Immae, and equally possible from another point of view to let the battle go unnamed, simply because it covered so much ground. It seems quite possible that these alternative procedures were represented in different groups or classes of sources; Zosimus and his source or sources happened to represent the latter method of dealing with the matter.

It is of course recognized that the explanation offered here is hypothetical, but it does seem to fit Zosimus' narrative, and above all it provides a satisfactory explanation of why Immae appears in some sources and not in others.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the reconstruction of

<sup>17</sup> Homo, *op. cit.* (above, n. 1) 94, thinks that the Roman vanguard met a Palmyrene detachment on the north bank of the Orontes; that the Roman cavalry, "harassée de fatigue," was inferior, in armament and experience, to the Palmyrene horse; and that Aurelian, ordering his cavalry not to attack, simultaneously sent his infantry across the river in order to threaten the enemy's line of retreat. While this interpretation is, in itself, perfectly possible (in the absence, of course, of the reconstruction proposed above), there is nothing in the text of Zosimus to support it. Mattingly (*loc. cit.*, above, n. 9) rearranges Zosimus' narrative to make Aurelian send his infantry across the Orontes, in order to complete the rout, only after the Palmyrene cavalry had been defeated. It is difficult to see why this rearrangement is necessary. J. Oberdick, "Ueber den ersten Feldzug des Kaisers Aurelian gegen die Zenobia bis zur Schlacht von Emisa," *ZöStG* 14 (1863) 740-741, apparently influenced by the biography of Aurelian in the *SHA*, thought that the first battle described by Zosimus took place at Daphne. This hypothesis led him to a fanciful reconstruction of the battle, according to which the Palmyrenes were drawn up on the left bank of the Orontes, with one wing resting on Daphne, the other on the Orontes, and Antioch in the center [!]; and the Palmyrenes allowed the Roman cavalry to cross the river before engaging them. Oberdick evidently had no good map of Antioch and its vicinity — perhaps he had no map at all, for this disposition of the Palmyrene forces is quite impossible. Moreover, there is no ground in the area between Daphne and Antioch in which cavalry manoeuvre of any extent is possible. Oberdick's fanciful reconstruction of the operations is repeated, with further elaboration, in his later study cited above (n. 4), 90-93. Zosimus' statement (1.50.3, p. 35.16) that the Roman infantry were sent *πέραν του Ὠρόντου ποταμοῦ* is a little obscure and unsatisfactory, no matter whether it be supposed that the battle took place near Antioch or near Immae. It may be suggested that the river across which the Roman troops were sent was the Oinoparas (mod. 'Afrin Su), which flows into the Lake of Antioch from the east (Strabo 16.2.8, 751c; cf. Dussaud, *op. cit.* [above, n. 4] 439). Aurelian would have crossed this river while following the road which led from Gindarus to the Antioch-Beroea road, and he might have met the Palmyrenes not long after crossing the Oinoparas. Zosimus, reading in a source that Aurelian sent his troops "across the river," might easily conclude that the river was the Orontes, and add that name on his own responsibility, in order to make his own account more precise.

the battle according to which a major part of the Palmyrene forces at Antioch were engaged and defeated provides a satisfactory explanation of why Zenobia at once evacuated Antioch. If, as some scholars have thought, the first engagement which Zosimus describes was merely a skirmish, it is difficult to understand why Zenobia should have thought it necessary to abandon Antioch. Groag's suggestion that she did so because of the hostile attitude of the population seems much less plausible than the explanation offered here.

As for the form in which the record of the battle has reached us in some of the chronicles, it is easy to see how both the necessity for brevity and differing interpretations can have been at work. The scholars who have supposed that Immae was written by mistake for Emesa have offered this explanation because (they believe) Emesa was the decisive battle of the campaign. Emesa was decisive in the sense that the main forces on both sides were engaged, which was not true of Immae, as that engagement can be reconstructed; certainly the battle of Emesa shows that the main body of the Palmyrene army was not defeated at Antioch. It is, nevertheless, true that the first clash which Zosimus describes, which it now seems likely was the battle of Immae, represented a defeat of such seriousness that the Palmyrenes had to abandon Antioch and that they were, after that time, on the defensive. A chronicler, required by his medium to record the principal battle of the campaign and no other, might mention Immae quite as well as Emesa, perhaps even with more reason (no chronicler, indeed, mentions the siege of Palmyra which finally brought about Zenobia's downfall). It would be natural to take the next step and make Zenobia's capture, as the climax of the campaign, a consequence of the battle of Immae.

Eutropius' statement that Aurelian captured Zenobia "*haud longe ab Antiochia sine gravi proelio*" illustrates the vagueness of the information which was available. The phrases "*haud longe ab Antiochia*" and "*sine gravi proelio*" could very well apply to the fight at Daphne as that is described by Zosimus, and by Aurelian's biographer in the *SHA*. Another writer, discovering a record of a battle at Immae, and knowing that Immae was near Antioch, could thus add the name of Immae to some such phrase as Eutropius used. Conversely, Eutropius, knowing of a battle at Immae and of a brief and insignificant engagement at Daphne, might telescope

the two, omitting the place names (if indeed he knew them) but keeping the "sine gravi proelio." Another possibility is that Eutropius' source contained a statement that Zenobia was captured without any real fighting. The source meant of course to refer to the capture of the queen at the Euphrates. The Euphrates itself, however, was not mentioned in the source. Eutropius reproduced his source's information with the words "sine gravi proelio," and then gratuitously inserted "haud longe ab Antiochia."

Most of the chroniclers appear to be closer to the truth than the biographer of Aurelian in the *SHA* and Malalas. The biographer knows nothing of the first clash in Zosimus, or of Immae; his silence merely betrays poor information, for he could hardly have failed to mention the engagement (whether he called it Immae or not) had he known about it. As it is, he appears to have confused the battle at Immae with the much less important fight at Daphne, which suggests that in his source no name was given to the battle at Immae. Malalas knows only that Zenobia camped along the Orontes (which she very likely did, probably on the plain across the river from Antioch<sup>18</sup>) and that Aurelian defeated her. This of course is true so far as it goes, but there is much legendary material in Malalas' account.<sup>19</sup> What evidently happened was that the chroniclers, having to make a selection of the events to be recorded, chanced to make choices which rendered their accounts partly right and partly wrong.

<sup>18</sup> If the Palmyrene forces were encamped in this position, which is the most suitable camp site near the city, this would provide a reason why Aurelian would avoid the Pagrae-Antioch road, which led out of the mountains directly into the Palmyrene camp.

<sup>19</sup> Malalas' remark about Zenobia being encamped along the river may be partly responsible for the belief of some scholars that the battle described by Zosimus occurred on the banks of the Orontes. On the legendary features of Malalas' account of Aurelian's encounter with Zenobia, see A. Schenk von Stauffenberg, *Die römische Kaiser Geschichte bei Malalas* (Stuttgart 1931) 385-386.